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THE EMERGENCE OF FREE MARKETS 
The world is discovering the value of free markets. Beginning in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, 
privatization and deregulation have spread to other nations. Most astonishingly, communist and socialist 
countries have begun to follow. and even the Soviet Union is poised to convert to a market economy. The 
democratic nations are just becoming aware of the full extent of the devastation that has foUowed socialism; and 
political leaders in post-communist countries often are reluctant to accept socialism even in its more moderate 
forms. As Sali Berisha, leader of the liberal Albanian Democratic Party put it: 
"Nothing socialist would be acceptable. I can't even become a social democrat. Socialism in any form 
is a failure, a real failure." (Berisha, 1991}. 
Why has socialism been rejected? Socialism has laudable goals such as the elimination of poverty and 
a more equitable society. Its failing lies not in its intentions; socialism has failed because socialist incentives 
contradict human nature. so that socialism cannot deliver on its promises. Human beings, whether employed by 
private enterprise or the public sector, tend to seek their own good before the good of society. 
And just as socialism and other forms of statism have proven incapable of producing comparative 
national affluence, the incentives of public monopoly have hampered the delivery of public services, such as public 
transport! even in free market nations. 
Discarded Conventional Wisdom This conference couid not have been held ten years ago. Then, 
conventional wisdom held that public transport must be provided by the public sector. It was presumed that the 
few remaining private providers around the world soon would be subsumed by the inevitable conversion to public 
operation, Strong arguments \Vere offered for this reliance on protected public monopoly. 
1. Public monopoly would reduce costs, since the public agency would not have to pay taxes and would 
not be required to earn a profit. Lower costs \vould also be achieved through the economies of scale 
available to a larger organization. 
2. Public managers and employees would give greater attention to the service of customers, since they 
would not be deterred by the profit motive. Instead, they would be driven by their commitment to the 
public welfare. 
The conversion of public transport to public monopolies did not result in lower pubHc transport costs. 
Despite the relief from taxesl pubHc transport costs lncreased at an extraordinary rate 1 and consumed public 
funding that could have produced many of the promised service improvements. The anticipated savings from 
economies of scale did not materialize, and often public transport is characterized by diseconomies of scale. 
Ridership has continued to fall (albeit a large percentage ofthereduction is related to demographic changes that 
\Vorked against public transport such as increased affluence, increased automobile usage, less dense development, 
inexpensive home ownership programs, etc.). And~ in many areas, public transport riders complain about service 
quality. 
Human Nature and Incentives Conventional wisdom failed to take account of hu1nan nature. Competition 
in the marketplace improves performance and keeps costs down, Alternatively, monopoly is characterized by 
higher prices and limited production. As a result, government routinely has limited the creation or the effect of 
monopoly in the private sector. 
At one time, some economic theorists believed that the problems of monopoly were problems of 
ownership- that only private monopolies were harmful; public monopolies were virtuous, because they would 
replace the profit motive with a public service motive. Experience, however, bas demonstrated the emptiness of 
this theory. 
As a group, the people who manage and operate public monopolies are no more virtuous than the people 
who manage and operate private businesses. Like private employees, government workers want higher standards 
of living. Accordingly, government employees steer their performance toward incentives and away from 
penalties. Hu1nan nature operates as surely in government as it does outside government. 
Incentives, however, are different in government than they are outside government. An individual, 
family, or company must make economic choices and live within its income. Efficient spending produces a better 
Hfet because more can be purchased with available income. In the short-term~ the economic situation can be 
improved only by efficient allocation of financial resources. Except in the most protected industries, the losses 
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that result from wasteful, inefficient spending are not borne by others. The rewards in the private sector are tied 
to obtaining the most value for the amount of available money. 
A government manager, however, faces a different set of incentives. Government management salaries 
are highly correlated to the sfae of the manager's staff and budget. If a public manager under-spends the budget 
or utilizes workers more productively, the manager will be penalized with a smaller budget and staff (in relative 
terms) in following years, and the manager's salary and career progression will be hampered. Alternatively, the' 
economic losses that result from wasteful, inefficient spending can be passed on to others - the taxpayers or 
ratepayers. In the public sector. then, managers are rewarded for inefficiency with higher funding, increased 
staffing, and enhanced career prospects. The rewards in government are tied to higher spending and the search 
for higher revenue. 
The Fiscal Challenge Nations face profound financial challenges. The governments of many affluent 
nations are operating at a deficit and are increasing the national debts rather than financing their operations 
through increased taxation. Taxpayers and ratepayers are increasingly reluctant to provide additional public 
revenue. 
The cost of government continues to rise1 fueled by ever higher interest charges on national debts) 
increased public service needsf and the continuing escalation of costs among existing public services. 
Public funding is a scarce resource. Clearly7 governments cannot afford to spend more than necessary · 
on any public service. When it does, service must be rationed; needed new services are denied; standards of living ! 
are lowered; unemployment is increased; and economies are made generally weaker. 
To maintain a high standard of living, it is necessary that government become economically efficient. 
Resources must be allocated efficiently; and resources are most efficiently aHocated through free markets. 
Liberalization of Public Transport The economics of public transport are no different than the 
economics of nations. As the world is learning from the difficult transition from socialism toward free markets 
in eastern Europe, those with a stake in the status quo are resolute in their reluctance to allow reform. 
The same is true of public transport. Public transport's generally declining market share and expanding 
percentage of public expenditure have commanded little or no attention within the public transport community. 
Comfortable managers and trade unions often have exhibited little concern about public transport's exceedingly i 
expensive decline. The resistance to needed reforms is well summarized by the following: 
..... invariably unwelcome is the dogmatic upheaval of public transport by born again politicians with 
a newly discovered solution privatization~ to the perceived iJis of public transport, which has 
mysteriously evaded both those before them and the transport professionals." (Bushel and Stonham, 
1986) 
Public choice economics explains why the need for change evaded transport professionals: 
" ... the "owners" of public enterprises (the taxpayers) are numerous and dispersed- no one of them 
has sufficient wealth at stake to make it worth taking an interest in the day to day operations of the 
firm. The managers and employees of public enterprises accordingly have a great deal of discretion 
which they may use to further their own private interests rather than or in addition to those of the public 
at large." (Shughart and Kimenyi, 1991) 
It should be no more surprising that those with a stake in the public sector monopoly model have not lead 
the needed reforms in public transport than that the reform of socialist economies is not being led by the 
nomenclatura. 
But, often over significant opposition, public transport's fiscal difficulties impelled political action to 
change the incentives of public transport from those of monopoly to those of competition. The perverse incentives 
of public transport and the fiscal challenges faced by government have combined to liberalize markets in public 
transport, just as national markets are being liberalized. In the past decade, there has been a strong trend toward 
the incorporation of competitive incentives in public tt3.nsport. 
OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION 
Low Automobile Dependency Nations Many developing nations copied the public monopoly model and 
established public transport monopolies. The results often were not successful. 
In some places such as Caracas and Santiago. Chilet rising costs and inadequate service has led to the 
abandonment of public operations and its replacement by private carriers. 
In other locations like Calcutta, Accra, Kampala, Khartoum, Lagos, Lima, Lusaka, and Maracaibo the 
percentage of transit provided by public operation has declined substantially. Privately operated transit has 
increased, 
Increased private participation is being encouraged in Turkey and Morocco. 
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These nev.·er private operations are not subsidized and typically use smaller vehicles (minibuses and 
shared ride taxis). 
In many developing nations, private carriers historically have provided an or most of the public transport 
trips. The private sector provides the majority of public transport trips in many cities such as Seoul, Buenos Aires, 
Sao Paulo, and Manila. 
Post .. Communist Nations Nations that now are in transition from Communism previously adopted the 
public monopoly model for public transport on ideological grounds. These nations face a formidable task in 
market development, because there is no private supplier market such as tours, charter bus, school bus or taxicab 
service. However, post communist nations may be well positioned to take advantage of the relatively low capital 
barriers to entry to develop a private sector for the provision of pubHc transport services. Automobile ownership 
in many such nations is still comparatively low, and public transport dependency is high. The large demand for 
public transport services could create opportunities for the development of mini-bus and shared ride taxicab 
services. Substantial advantages could occur: 
• The necessity for public subsidy couid be reduced, if not eliminated- an important consideration 
for economically distressed nations. 
• Private operation of public transport services that use less expensive smaller vehicles could provide 
an important entrepreneurial boost to the economy. Public transport is one of the most obvious and 
immediate opportunities for supplier market development in liberalizing countries. 
High Automobile Dependency Nations Private providers operate substantial levels of services in 
nations with high automobile dependency. In Japan, a large number of private providers operate non-subsidized 
rail and bus service. Othernations, such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, have or will soon deregulate 
public transport services. In these cases, all services requiring public subsidy will be purchased by governments 
through competitive tendering. The conversion to deregulation and competitive tendering is less complex 
because a private transportation supplier market exists. The balance of this paper will outline the experience in 
competitive tendering of public transport service. 
COMPETITIVE TENDERING 
Competitive tendering is the provision of a public service through a competitively awarded contract. The 
government chooses what services to competitively tender and chooses the private providers from which it 
purchases the services. Competitive tendering involves a synthesis of public and private roles. The publiesector 
decides what services should be competitively tendered and what specifications should apply to the service. The 
competitive market responds to the invitation of the government, and one or more producer is selected to provide 
a specific service for a period of time. The public sector retains poHcy control over the service; while the 
competitive market produces the service under public scrutiny. Competitive tendering is being used around the 
world for a variety of public services, including public transport. 
The Economics of Competitive Tendering The fundamental advantage of competitive tendering for 
governments is that it saves money. Competitive tendering brings competitive incentives to the production costs 
of a public service and reduces public costs in three ways: 
1. Lower costs through provision of service at no more than the competitive rate (the "going" rate). 
2. Lower costs through the "ripple effect" as public agencies improve their cost perfonnance in response 
to the competitive environment. 
3. Lower net costs as a result of tax revenues) licenses, and fees paid by private contractors on the public 
services they operate. 
How Competitive Tendering Works There are five basic steps in the competitive tendering process: 
1. The government seeks competitive tenders for delivery of a specific quality and quantity of service for 
a defined period of time. 
2. A contract is awarded to the lowest responsible and responsive tenderer that demonstrates the ability 
to provide the required quality and quantity of service. 
3. Contractors that fail to provide the service as specified are financially penalized or replaced, 
4. New competitive tenders are sought in sufficient time to award a new contract for service commencing 
at the expiration of the contract. 
Principles of Competitive Tendering There are two fundamental principles of competitive tendering 
of public services: 
1. The government should retain full policy control, detenniningwhichservices are purchased, establishing 
quality and safety standards, administering contracts, and monitoring service performance. 
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2. The government should foster a competitive market. The maintenance of a competitive market 
is crucial to the success of competitive tendering. Private monopoly should not be tolerated any 
more than public monopoly. Fostering a competitive market requires: 
• Wide participation and full disclosure of information, so that all potential interested proposers 
have sufficient information to submit a tender if they desire. 
+ Limitation of contract duration (usually no more than five years including renewal options). 
+ Limitation of tender size1 so that smaller companies have an opportunity to participate. 
• Cost control through a requirement for fixed-price tenders, and prohibition of price negotiation 
after contract execution. 
• No government specification of labor arrangements except compliance with applicable law. 
Competitive tendering saves money not because the private sector is superior to the public sector; 
competitive tendering saves money because competition induces lower costs than monopoly. Services provided 
by private contractors are as fully public services as the same services provided by governments and public 
authorities, because the government remains in complete control. 
United Kingdom: London A 1984 act of Parliament required that competitive tendering of bus services 
begin in London. Before that timet virtually all of the bus services of London Transport were operated under a 
protected monopoly, The same act set up the former public bus monopoly as an subsidiary of London Regional 
Transport (which later re-assumed the London Transport name). Tendering began in 1985 and is administered 
by the Tendered Bus Unit of London Transport 
Currently, more than 35 percent of LT bus service is competitively tendered, amounting to more than 200 
routes, 1,500 buses, and 90 million annual vehicle kilometers. The tendered services of London Transport would, 
if separate, be one of the world's largest urban bus networks. 
Tendering is expanding at about five percent of LT bus services annually. Sixty percent of tendered 
services are operated by twelve subsidiaries of London Bus, which has responded to the competitive environment 
by reducing costs. This phenomenon is known as the "ripple" effect, in which publicly owned enterprises begin 
to exhibit the more cost effective performance in response to the threat or reality of competition. Seventeen 
private providers account for the other tendered services, This service is administered by a staff of 40 in the 
Tendered Bus Unit. Cost savings have been estimated at 15 percent, and improved service quality has been 
reported. 
LT determines the route alignments, tjrnetables, and fare structure. Service and vehicle specifications 
are set by LT. Private providers tender gross rates per service kilometer (the passenger fares remain the property 
of London Transport). Tender packages may involve single routes or extensive networks. This approach makes 
it possible for small private providerS to compete for some contracts. Contracts are awarded using a variety of 
factorS, including price. experience, financial ability~ etc. 
Contracts are for up to three years with renewals of up to three years. No contract may be renewed a 
second time. Contract rates are periodically adjusted based upon an index of inflation. 
The London approachinvoJves a form of separation of policy (service planning and contract administration) 
from operations~ the or&anization administering the public transport system and the competitive tenders does 
not tender for the services. However. London Buses. Ltd. is a subsidiary of London Transport, and, in some early 
tenders, it was alleged that London Bus cross subsidized tendered services with subsidies provided for its non~ 
tendered services. Steps have been taken to ensure fair cost competition by London Bus. 
Despite the extent and success of competitive tendering in London, there are indications that its scope 
might be limited in the future. TI1e Conservative government has announced that, if it should win the next 
election, public transport in London will be deregulated, and a government consultation paper suggests that the 
design will be similar to that of outside London. 
United Kingdom: Outside London Public transport bus services were deregulated in the United 
Kingdom outside London in 1986. The act of Parliament permitted public transport authorities to competitively 
tender for services that were not provided commercially. and it placed restrictions on the ability of public transport 
authorities to intervene in or regulate commercial operations (such as specifying fares, timetables, etc.). Before 
deregulation, most public transport services were provided by protected public monopolies. 
More than 75 percent of public transport bus services are operated commercially. Remaining services 
determined to be "socially necessary" by governments are competitively tendered, usually in packages covering 
only a few vehicles, and often only one, Tendered services are often established to fill low demand times 
(evenings, weekends. etc.} or are extensions of commercial routes. As a result, tender packages tend to be small 
and a pubJic transport authority may administer more than one hundred contracts. 
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Requests for tenders may require proposal of either net or gross rates. Net tenders involve the tendering 
of a subsidy rate instead of a total cost rate, and the private provider assumes the risk for the passenger fares. 
Timetables and route alignments are specified by the public transport authority, though alternative tenders 
usually are permitted. A variety of evaluation factors govern the a\vard of contracts. 
Contracts may not be a\varded for a period of more than five years under the act In n1any instances, 
contract rates are periodically adjusted according to an inflation index, 
'fhe deregulated system involves a form of separation of policy from operations. Governments that 
administer public transport have been required to set up separate organizations if they \vlsh to continue to o\vn 
a public transport enterprise. In some cases, the publicly O\vned enterprises have been sold to private investors. 
The dereguiuted public transport system has received both praise and criticism, There appears to be 
agreement on the substantial savings in public expenditure. Critics, ho\vever, contend that the limitations on 
public planning prohibit sufficient coordination of fares and services. The experience of Ne,vcastle on Tyne, 
however, may suggest that coordination can be achieved \vith sufficient detennination. 
Dedicated school bus services (inside and outside London) are provided under contract, but not subject 
to the competitive tendering requirements that govern public transport. 
Sweden In 1989, parliament passed legislation eliminating exclusive licenses to provide public transport 
services. Before this regulatory revision, public transport bus services were provided by protected public and 
private monopolies under negotiated contracts 'vitb county councils, Holders of licenses had the right to require 
a public buy~out of their assets; however any company participating in competitive tendering forfeited this right 
The effect of this legislation was to encourage competitive tendering of urban publie transport services by the 
county councils. 
Services in at least 16of the nation's 24 counties have been competitively tendered, and it is expected that 
competitive tendering will be implemented in additional counties. Some competitive tendering has begun in 
Stockholm; and Stockholm Transport, which is owned by theStoekholm County Council, has been separated into 
operating divisions in anticipation of competitive tendering. Three counties have decided not to competitively 
tender services, believing that they can obtain lo\ver costs through negotiated contracts. 
The county couneils determine the services to be provided and the passenger fares. Service requirements 
gradually have become more prescriptive. Tender packages generally cover geographical corridors or sectors 
rather than individual routes. Tenderer.; propose a gross rate. Contract a\vard is based upon a variety of factor.>, 
though there is political pressure to give preference to the lowest priced tender. 
Contract lengths are typically three to five years. Contractor rates are periodically adjusted based upon 
a fraction of an inflation index. Early indications are that cost savings are averaging from five to fifteen percent. 
Coincidentally, local rail services may now be competitively tendered, and a privately operated rail 
service is due to begin operation. Policy is separated from operations. 
New Zeala11d A 1990 act of Parliament required that all public transport services be provided 
commercially or under a "competitive pricing procedure." Before this reform, most public transport services 
were provided by protected public monopolies. 
Services under the new regime begin on 1July1991, and the reforms will be in full operation after a 
transition period of five years (this includes a special "incumbent" price preference adopted for Auckland). 
Regional councils are permitted (but not required) to establish regional public transport plans, which specify 
services to be operated and fare structures. Public transport providers (publieand private) generally may operate 
any commercial service, but the regional councils have broad latitude to competitively purchase service that meets 
the requirements of the regional transport plans, even \Vhere commercial services are provided. 
The system seeks modal neutrality. All land transport, including urban rail services. bus services, and 
small vehlcle services are included in the regulatory reform. As a result, tendering authorities may not specify 
a size or type of vehicle. 
Regional councils may determine route alignments and establish fare structures for tendered services, 
Tenders may be either net or gross. A limitation has been placed on the maximum tender size to permit 
competition by the smaller private providers. Tenders wili be evaluated using a system designed to eliminate from 
consideration sub-standard services after which preference usually will be for the lowest priced tenderer. 
Periodically, rates wi11 be adjusted using a portion of an index of inflation, 
The Ne'v Zealand approach 'vill involve fuli separation of policy from operations, Governmental units 
that competitively render for service \Vill not be permitted to O\Vn public transport enterprises. 
Early indications suggest that most services \vill not be commercially operated, and that, as a result, 
competitive tendering 'vill be the dominant mechanism for service sponsorship. 
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Competitive tendering of aJI dedicated school bus service also began within the last five years. The 
maximum contract duration is six yea~. . . . , . . . 
Copenhagen In 1989, the Dantsh parhament enacted mandatory competitive tendering legislation with 
re ard to Copenhagen public transport bus services. Under the legislation. Hovedstadsomradets Trafikselska~ 
(JT) was required tocompelitivelytenderl5percentofbusservices by April 1; 1991, another 15 p".rcent by Apnl 
1, 1993, and the final 15 percent by April!, 1994. It is anticipated that approximately 550 buses wt!! be operated 
under competitively tendered contracts when the 45 percent mandate is reached. 
Before competitive tendering began, approximately 82 percent of bus services were directly operated by 
HT with the remainder operated under subsidy agreements by private providers. Under the new arrangement. 
the subsidy agreements have been terminated. 
ITT wHl continue to plan and coordinate an services, and determine routes. timetables, and fares. All 
buses will operate with the HT livery. Upon enactment of the legislation, HT began intensive planning efforts 
including a consultive process with potential private providers. The first requests for tenders were issued well 
before the initial April 1.1991 deadline. To give operators a sufficient period of time to prepare for service, HT 
plans to seek tenders in May 1991 for services to be transferred to competitive operation in April 1992. Operators 
are to be selected in August 1991. 
HT has taken steps to ensure that there is sufficient competition and is seeking to design its process to 
permit the entry of new private providers. While the legislation allows maximum contract lengths of eight years. 
!IT has opted for a four year maximum contract length. Individual tender packages are kept small enough to 
attract smaller entrants. Private providers tender a fixed price for the first year of the contractj prices of 
subsequent year prices are adjusted by an inflation index:. HT uses six criteria to select contractors including 
measures of financial ability, experience. service quality, and price. Policy is not separated from operations. 
United States The dominant of service provision for public transport bus services is the protected public 
monopoly. However, a trend has developed toward competitive tendering over the past decade. In 1980, very 
little service was competitively tendered (less than 100 buses). This has grown to more than 3,500 buses in 1990 
(8 percent). One state, Colorado, legislatively mandated a level of competitive tendering (20 percent). 
A high percentage of new and expanded services has been competitively tendered over the last decade. 
Cost savings have averaged 30 percent. In cases where the protected monopoly status of the public operator is 
removed. ''ripple" effect cost savings have been identified. White there have been isolated exceptions, service 
quality has been equal to or improved in comparison to previous public monopoly operation. The few reports 
of reduced quality have come from public transport agencies that have been resistant to competitive tendering, 
In the cases where pub Uc agencies purchased services from public monopolies but have converted to competitive 
tendering, there is near consensus that service quality and safety have improved. 
Most tenders are gross. T enderers usually are required to propose a rate per service hour or service mile 
for each year of the anticipated contract. The failure to periodicaHy adjust rates by a measure of inflation increases 
the risk to the private providers. Tender sizes may be large, but usually permit segmentation so that smaller 
private providers can compete. [n some cases, fuel tax escalators are built into the contracts. Evaluation of 
tenders is typically based on a variety of factors, though there is a trend toward methods that eliminate sub-
standard operators from consideration when lowest cost is the final evaluation criteria. Public transport agencies 
sometimes submit a tender in competition with the private operators. White this practice may focus attention to 
the difference in costs between public and private operation and thus may iead to "ripple" effect savings, there 
have been a number of allegations of unfair tender pricing by public transport operators. 
In some urban areas there is separation of administration from operations, while in most urban areas 
policy is not separate from operations. 
Private providers have been used in dedicated school bus service for many years. 111e largest company 
operates more than one third as many buses as the entire public transport industry (17,000). In the early years, 
contracts were developed through negotiation rather than competitive tendering. There is a trend toward 
competitive tendering in the school bus industry, and, next year, school bus services in the nation's largest city, 
New York, will be competitively tendered. Currently, private operators produceapproximately30percentof the 
school bus service with more than 100;000 buses. Public and private dedicated school buses carry more than 
double the number of passengers carried on all public transport modes. 
Private providers also provide most demand responsive services (dial-a~ride services typicaHy tailored 
for the elderly and disabled) in which approximately 70 percent of service is competitively tendered. 
Australia Some competitive tendering has begun in New South Wales as bus services are replacing rural 
rail services and late night urban rail services. 
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However, a more comprehensive Nev,.· South Wales regulatory reform may lead to competitive tendering 
and. if its proponents are right, may achieve the advantages of competitive tendering without displacing formerly 
protected private franchised providers. 
lo 1990, the New South Wales Parliament passed a regulatory reform aimed at establishing service levels 
and fare standards for franchised (non-competitive) privately provided services. Before that time, most of the 
suburban services in the Sydney area \Vere provided by protected private monopolies. Subsidies \Vere limited to 
concessionary fare reimbursements. These companies operate more than 1,500 buses. 
The new regulatory environment \vilJ require the Department of Transport to establish five year 
contracts with the private providers. Subsidies still win be limited to concessionary fare reimbursements. The 
contracts will cover geographical sectors, and \Vill average 50 buses in size. The private providers \ViU be required 
to provide specific levels of service based upon overall policy objectives and \vill be Hmited in their ability to raise 
passenger fares. Private providers that are unable to meet the terms of the contract will have their services 
competitively tendered, It is anticipated that private providers meeting the terms of the contract \vill receive 
automatic five year rene\vals at the end of each contract period. 
The Sydney approach reties on the private providers to determine route alignments and timetables \Vi thin 
the overall confines of public policy. This approach may be considered competitive tendering hy threat. 
Concurrently, publicly operated State Transit (which provides the inner city bus services) is under 
pressure to improve its financial performance. The organization has been divided into six operating units, and 
competitive tendering has been threatened if subsidy reduction goals are not met. 
Most school bus service is competitively tendered in Australia. 
South Africa Urban public transport services are provided in South Africa by protected public and 
private monopolies. Kombi~taxis (shared ride taxis) also provide a regulated alternative to many of these services. 
The central government has been interested in injecting competition to reduce the level of pubiicsubsidy 
to the protected monopolies. The Department of Transport (DOT) established competitive tendering 
demonstration projects to replace some of the privnte services. 
DOT issued the requests for tenders and administers the contracts. DOT establishes the service leveJs, 
sets a fare structure, and estabHshes general requirements with respect to contractor provided buses. Tenderern 
may propose an alternate fare structure or a1ternative service levels. 
The private providers tender a subsidy rate per service kilometer and assurne the risk for fare revenues 
("net'' tenders)" TI1e contract award decision is based on multiple factors, including low rate, experience, financial 
condition, facilities. vehicles, etc. 
Contracts are awarded for a period of three years. The contractor's rate is adjusted on a quarterly basis 
using an inflation index. According to early indications, cost savings are being achieved, and the program is 
considered a success, 
Parliament may consider a competitive tendering bill next year. It has not been decided whether public 
monopoly services wiH be subjected to competitive tendering. 
Canada Most public transport in Canada is provided by protected public monopolies. Some smaller 
public transport systems are competitively tendered in British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan and Quebec, 
Among the major metropolitan centers, competitive tenderlng is limited to suburban communities in Toronto, 
and there have been important recent inroads in metropolitan Toronto. Interest in competitive tendering is 
increasing among some politieal officials and among organizations representing private bus companies. There 
is no separation of policy from operations. 
The majority of dedicated school bus services are provided under competitive tender. 
Elsewhere Competitive tendering is occurring in other locations as welt For example: 
+ In Lille, France competitive tendering accounts for 28 bus routes over which more than 60 buses 
operate. Routes and fares are determined by the public authority. 
+ Competitive tendering accounts for five bus routes in Porto, Portugal 
+ Competitive tendering is scheduled to begin soon in Santiago; Chile. 
+ Competitive tendering is occurring in Finland. 
Proposed Conversions Pariiamentary proposaisare anticipated or being considered in Ireland, Norway, 
and South Africa. Further, various national nnd provincial liberal political parties have planned to legislate 
competitive tendering upon forming governments. 
Even where competitive tendering has not been adopted, there is heightened concern about the rise of 
public transport subsidies. A number of national and provincial governments have established programs to 
reduce public trnnsport subsidies or to control their gro\vth more effectively. Competitive tendering yet mny be 
incorporated in nations that find these approaches insufficient. 
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A recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggests that the trend 
toward competitive tendering is likely to expand in both public transport and other public services. 
"(there is) ... a greater recognition that, in a number of areas, the private sector may be a lower cost 
producer of services traditionally produced by the public sector. The potential for market testing of 
government activities remains under utilized." (Oxley, Maher, Martin & NicoJetti, 1990). 
TIIE STRATEGIC POSITION OF COMPETITIVE TENDERING 
The advantages of competitive tendering among public transport service delivery alternatives should be 
judged in context of the objectives of public transport. Among the highly automobile dependent nations, there 
is public policy consensus that there should be a government role in public transport-the only disagreement is 
over the extent of that role. 
The Purpose of Public Transport The justification for public funding for public transport is the benefits 
that it can provide to society. These benefits fall into two general categories: 
!. Social benefits: Public transport provides the primary form of mobility for many economically 
disadvantaged people- these are the public transport dependent (the captive market), and their 
mobility is an important social goal. 
2. Environmental benefits: Public transport provides mobility to discretionary riders - those who make 
trips by public transport that they might otherwise make by a utomobite. This reduces road congestion, 
air pollution and energy consumption. This can also result in lower public expenditures for road 
construction. 
The customers of public transport. then, include not only the riders but also the community in general. 
Public transport should serve the riders by providing the highest level of safe and quality service possible at the 
lowest cost And public transport should serve the taxpayers by providing the desirable level of safe, quality 
service at the lowest cost. The customers of public transport are the riders ruid the taxpayers or ratepayers. 
The public purpose of public transport, then is the movement of greatest number of people in a safe and 
comfortable manner for a given level of expenditure over a sustained period of time. No other objectives should 
distort or displace this purpose. 
Evaluation of the Service Structures The most appropriate public transport service structure wlJl 
produce services (outputs) that attract the greatest number of passengers while consuming the lowest costs 
(inputs); and it will address the public purpose of public transport over time. 
l!mlil: Given the difficulty of attracting larger market shares to public transport services in highly 
automobile dependent nations. and in view of the consistent evidence that cost performance can be influenced 
by service structures, cost performance may be considered of prime importance. GeneraUy, the public transport 
organization structure that costs the least is likely to be the least burdensome to society, There are three primary 
cost issues. 
• Labor costs should be determined by the competitive market rather than being set administratively. 
• Work rules should be determined by the competitive market rather than administratively. 
• Public transport operators should have the maximum latitude to organize pubHc transport work 
consistent with applicable labor iaws and regulations. 
Qillrull: The public transport service structure should facilitate the highest levels of public transport use, 
l There are four primary service issues: 
+ Public transport services should be safe and of sufficient quality. 
• The public transport system should be comprehensive to permit reasonable access to all parts of the 
urban area. A comprehensive system affords effective mobility for the transport dependent while 
offering potential for growth in discretionafY ridership. 
+ The public transport system should be coordinated with broad information available concerning 
routes and schedules. There should be interchangeable fare media between services: and a 
coordinated fare structure. An appropriate level of coordination can assist public transport in 
retaining present ridership and may facilitate higher ridership. This is particularly important where 
automobile usage is high. 
• To the extent that increasing discretionary ridership is an objective; public transport services should 
be designed in response to markets needs, 
Consistency with the Public Purpose Another important issue is the capacity of the service structure to 
achieve the public purpose of public transport A service structure that addresses the public purpose should be 
stable enough to minimize any tendency to degenerate toward a service structure less able to satisfy the public 
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purpose. This is a serious concern given the predilection of various political parties and factions to pursue policies 
that place the interest of public employees over those of the public. 
Service Structure Models \Vhile there are many potential combinations of service structures for public 
transport, five general models are revie\ved. The functional roles under the models are outlined in the figure 1 
"'Public Transport Services Structures and Functions," and are discussed belo\v. 
A. Public Monoiml,): Public monopoly is the form of public transport organization most typical in 
AustraJia, Canada, the US and some European nations. Usually a unit of government designs and operates all 
public transport services 'vithout competition either in or for the market. (Direct competition on routes is 
competition "in" the market, 'vhile competition for tendered services is competition ''for" the market.) 
·rhe ovenvhelming characteristic of public monopoly is its tendency toward cost escalation, \vhich 
negates its advantages. While public monopoly theoretically is capable of producing a comprehensive public 
transport system, the scope of the system is restricted by inordinately high costs. Public monopoly can produce 
coordinated service and fore systems. But public monopoly tends to be particularly ill equipped to produce 
mark et oriented services that attrnctlarger travel market shares. (For example, in the US during the 1980s,public 
transport market share declined in nearly all urban areas constructing ne'\v rail systems.) There have been 
exceptions, such as Toronto. where public monopoly has increased urban travel market But even there the 
increased market share \Vas accompanied by rapidly escalating unit costs to the financial detri1nent of the riders 
and the taxpayers. 
Customers must rely on the good intentions of public monopolies to produce services of sufficient quality 
and safety, and the record predictably is mixed. 
Public monopoly tends, then, to serve objectives far different than those generally postulated for public 
transport. The interests best served by public monopoly tend to be those of the public transport managers and 
employees. The result is less service than othenvise would be provided and at a higher cost These entrenched 
jnterests are quite capable of preventing or slowing needed reforms. 
If it is assumed that public transport ultimately will serve its public purpose, then public monopoly must 
be vie\ved as transitional. In vie\v of what is kno\vn about public organizational dynamics; public monopoly is not 
a practicable, long-term public policy strategy for achieving the sociai and environmental goals of pubiic 
transport 
B. Private Monopolv Protected private monopoly '\vas '\videspread Jn the United Kingdom and the US 
before the 1970s and still exists in some nations. Private companies held exclusive franchises to operate service 
over particular routes, urban area sectors, or entire urban areas. They are not subject to competition either in or 
for the market. Fares and services are, however, usually regulated by a governmental unit. 
Private monopoly's primary disadvantages relate to its higher than competitive costs (though cost 
escalation tends to be lower than in public monopoly) and the impacts of that escalation. 
As unit costs rise relative to the economy. private companies 1nay be unable to maintain comprehensive 
service levels and affordabie fares, especial1y as automobile dependency grows. This may result in pressure for 
a conversion to public monopoly, further retarding the achievement of public objectives, 
As in the case of public monopoly, private monopolies do not depend upon customers for their survival, 
and incentives for service quality and safety are \Veak. 
Private monopoly permits the delivery of a comprehensive system (though less of one, due to the higher 
costs) and a coordinated system under the puhHc regulatory umbrella. Market oriented service designs are more 
likely to occur than under public monopoly. 
Private monopoly, then, also should be vie\ved as transitional. It is like1y to survive only \Vhere the 
demand for pubHctransport service is strong enough to support higher than competitive fares and cost structures. 
Finally, some recent conversions from private monopoly have not degenerated into public monopoly. 
Some jurisdictions simply have converted to competitive systems \vi th.out compensating the previously protected 
private monopolies. Others have taken the canceled monopoly protection upon acceptance of any subsidy. Or, 
as in Sydney, the threat of competition can be used as a means of transition from private monopoly. 
C. CQmpetitive Tendering Competitive tendering of all public transport service in an urban area is 
another service structure. It requires a public tendering body to determine routes and service packages, to 
develop requests for tenders, to evaluate tenders, to monitor service, and to coordinate services and fares. A 
competitively tendered system is characterized by competition for, but not in, the market. There is movement 
toward this model in Copenhagen and S\veden and, to a lesser degree, in the US. London has been advancing 
to,vard this model, and its future direction is likely to be determined in the next ParHamentary eJection. Some 
urban areas in Ne\v Zealand may foHO\V this model \vith regional authorities belng permitted to competitively 
tender for specifically designed services at particular fares if such services are not provided commercially (using 
their regional planning authority). 
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Th rimary advantages of a competitive tendering model are that a comprehensive and coordinated 
br c trans~~rt system couJd be provided at the lowest possible cost. Because the public would retain full control ~~ sy~tem design, a competitive tendering model would be strongly sustainable. 
Competitive tendering has potential for safe service of sufficient quality. Often, it is simpler for a contract 
administrator to take disciplinary action against an offending service supplier than it is for a public agency to 
correct internal service quality and safety problems. Public administrators have cited improved quality control 
as an advantage of competitive tendering. 
The primary disadvantage of a competitive tendering model is its failure to use the competitive market 
to design services to attract discretionary riders. The extent of this disadvantage, however, depends upon the 
extent to which a particular market is commercial from the standpoint of demand. Regardless, increased ridership 
is likely to occur simply from the higher service levels that this cost effective approach fosters. 
Another disadvantage is that services are likely to be designed less cost-effectively than under competitive 
operation with tendering, since the operators of the service would not design the timetables. 
A competitive tendering system may be the most appropriate public transport service structure where 
the market for public transport is largely non-commercial, and where there appears to be little latent demand for 
public transport services. Urban areas with lower residential and employment densities and which tend to be 
commercially decentralized may be most appropriate for the competitive tendering model. 
The competitive tendering model also would be appropriate where public policy places a high value on 
coordination of services and fares, or where automobiles are such an attractive alternative to passengers that 
ridership might easily be lost if the public transport system is not sufficiently coordinated. Competitive tendering 
retains the public mechanism to maximize consumer information about the public transport system and to 
simplify its use through coordinated services and fares. 
D. CompetitiyeOperation withTenderina This service structure (called "deregulation" in the United 
Kingdom) permits the competitive market to provide services at market fares with minimal intervention by 
government in commercial operations. Government may intervene only to competitively tender services that are 
not provided by the competitive market. Competitive operation with tendering is typified primarily by 
competition in the market and secondarily by competition for the market. Competitive operation with tendering 
exists in the United Kingdom outside London and is proposed for London. Some urban areas in New Zealand 
may follow this model. 
The fundamental advantage of competitive operation with tendering is its potential for the lowest input 
costs. Not only are labor costs and work rules established in the competitive market, but services are designed 
and organized through the competitive market. Competitive operation with tendering also permits the 
establishment of a comprehensive public transport system with gaps being filled by competitive tendering. 
Customers can exercise influence over service quality and safety where they have a choice. 
The fundamental criticism of competitive operation with tendering is that it has failed to produce 
coordinated services and fare structures (though fare coordination has been achieved in Newcastle on Tyne 
through cooperative efforts of the operators). If passengers perceive that they are not well served by the system, 
they might combine with trade unions to seek establishment or re-establishment of public monopoly. 
Competitive operation with tendering may be most appropriate in more commercial public transport 
markets or in markets where there is substantial latent demand. 
E. Threatened Competition This service delivery model is being implemented in the Sydney area of 
New South Wales, where it is being used to convert from the private monopoly model to a competitive model. 
Operators would be required to meet broad service and fare standards or have their services competitively 
tendered. Franchises will be granted forno more than five years. The threatened competition model will involve 
neither competition in, nor competition for, the market but will rely on the threat of competition for the market. 
The threatened competition model is likely to result in comprehensive and coordinated services at 
relatively low cost. An advantage is that services and work organization would be determined by entrepreneurs 
rather than public bureaucracies. Another advantage of the threatened competition model is that it is more likely 
to evolve into a competitive tendering model than a public monopoly model. 
Threatened competition may encourage generally safe, quality service so long as effective consumer 
compliant mechanisms are in place and effectively monitored by the regulatory body. 
The primary disadvantage of the threatened competition model is that, especially where it is a transition 
from a private monopoly model, costs are likely to be higher than necessary. Only genuine competition is likely 
to produce long-term market determined costs, and certainly the deregulation experience in various industries 
around the world demonstrates the propensity of regulated environments to evolve inordinately high cost 
structures. 
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-The threatened competition model is likely to be most appropriate in an entrepreneurial supplier market 
that tends to be commercial. 
The figure 2, "Public Transport Service Structures and the Public Purpose" outlines the strengths and 
\veaknesses of the service structure n1odels. 
COMPETITIVE TENDERING AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
The debate about the appropriate role and extent of competitive tendering in public transport wiU 
continue. Some analysts believe that competitive tendering is a step toward competitive opera ti on with tendering. 
Others suggest that competitive operation with tendering is a step toward competitive tendering. StiB others 
suggest that competitive operation with tendering is a step toward threatened competition. FinalJy, one nation, 
New Zealand, has established a public policy framework that permits elected officials in each urban area to 
establish systems characterized by competitive tendering or characterized by competitive operation with 
tendering, 
One point is beyond dispute: protected monopoly models have been proven incapable of meeting the 
social and environmental goals of pubHc transport. Alternatively~ service structures that incorporate competitive 
incentives can address the public purpose. 
+ Service structures that incorporate competition are most likely to achieve public cost objectives. 
t Increased public transport ridership can be achieved cost effectively only through more market 
oriented services. 
• The question is, therefore, which of the service structures is likely to best meet the public purpose 
of public transport. 
No single service structure is appropriate to all environments. The proper public transport service 
structure can be detennined best by a careful evaluation of local public policy goals, the nature of the market 
demand, and the nature of the supplier market. (Refer to Figure 3: Service Structure Characteristics.) 
Where public policy desires to increase public transport ridership, or where demand markets are more 
commercial. structures that pennit entrepreneurs to establish services in response to the market would seem to 
be most appropriate (competitive operation with tendering and threatened competition). The long term success 
of the competitive operation with tendering and threatened competition models will depend upon the existence 
of strong customer demand, or of strong latent demand. Besides the locations in which it is already being used, 
competition operation with tendering would appear to have a strong potential for serving the public purpose ion 
the post communist nations, which are characterized by particularly strong customer demand, and in countries 
with lower levels of automobile access (where public transport may account for more than 70percentof the urban 
travel market). Threatened competition would appear to be particularly appropriate where there is an interest 
in the transition from the private monopoly model, while also serving the public purpose (and necessarily avoiding 
public monopoly). 
Where service and fare coordination are the prime public policy considerations or where the demand 
market is less commercial. a service structure that facilitates a comprehensive and coordinated public transport 
system is most appropriate-competitive tendering. Competitive tendering may, indeed, be the only alternative 
for achieving the public purpose in urban ares where there is little latent customer demand. For example, many 
medium sized and smaller US metropolitan areas (less than three million population) are characterized by widely 
dispersed commercial development, and the public transport share of the urban travel market is minuscule (often 
three percent or less). In such urban areas, it would be difficult to make a credible case for the existence of material 
latent customer demand. 
Finally, in fashioning service structures, the supplier market must be considered. Responsive supplier 
markets are not quickly developed, especiaHy where there are not ancillary competitive services such as tour, 
charter, school bus, or elderly and disabled services. Public policy should be directed toward fostering the 
development and maintenance of truly competitive supplier markets as soon as feasible. It may be more 
important to set in motion the mechanisms to achieve an efficiently operating market over a period of years than 
to seek immediate conversion to a "perfect" structure where the environment is not ready to accommodate 
perfection. A balance must be struck between disruption that might serve reactionary political forces and action 
sufficiently resolute that those with a state in the status quo are unable to impede progress. 
For public transport to maximize its benefits to society1 competitive incentives must operate. The extent 
and nature of the most appropriate competitive incentives will depend upon the individual eharacterlstics of each 
market. 
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-PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICE STRUC'!URES AND FUNCTIONS 
SERVICE STRUCTURES 
Compc· Competitive Threat· 
Public Private titive Operation 
'""' 
Mooo- Mono· Tcrtder- with Compe-
FUNCTION poly poly ins Tendering tillon 
' 
i. Overlll.l System Planrting Gov't Oov"t Gov't Privo.t'l! Gov't 
l 
!, Service Design Gov't Private Go'o''t Private Plivatc I 
Operation or Scrvlces Gov't Private Private Plivute Privruc 
' I For ln & 
Nature of Competition None None 
"'' 
For !he 'Threot 
Mattel Marltet 
Figure 1. Public Transport Services Structures and Functions 
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Figure 2. Public TrllllSport Service Structures and the Public Purpose 
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Figure 3. Service Structure Characteristics 
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